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Abstract
Until recently, the neoclassical growth theory and the neoclassical
labour market theory have independently evolved over time without
communicating to each other. The neoclassical growth theory (Solow,
1956), born after the second world war, assumes full employment. On
the other hand, the unemployment theory (Friedman, 1968) turned
the attention to the problem of ination, ignoring that one of growth.
In this paper I present recent contributions suggesting that such a
sharp division may be unjustied from a theoretical viewpoint.
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1 Introduction
Until recently, the neoclassical growth theory and the neoclassical labour
market theory have independently evolved over time without communicat-
ing to each other. The neoclassical growth theory (Solow, 1956), born after
the second world war, assumes full employment. On the other hand, the
unemployment theory (Friedman, 1968) turned the attention to the problem
of ination, ignoring that one of growth. However, some recent contribu-
tions have suggested that such a sharp division may be unjustied from a
theoretical viewpoint.
The starting point of this survey is a brief description of the dichotomy
between growth and employment. Then, after analysing the problems of this
approach, I survey the new "growth and employment" literature. The rst
attempt to drop the dichotomy above-mentioned is represented by the contri-
bution of Pissarides (1990). He nds a negative relationship between growth
and unemployment: at higher growth rate, wages and vacancies are higher
and unemployment lower. This e¤ect of growth is called the "capitalization
e¤ect". At faster rate of technological progress all future income ows are
discounted at a lower rate. Because the cost of creating a vacancy is borne
now, whereas the prots from it accrue in the future, the lower discount rate
increases job creation.
On the other hand, Schumpeterian models of growth (Aghion and
Howitt, 1998) go in the opposite direction. The increased growth is likely to
produce an increased rate of job-turnover, and the search theories of Lucas
and Prescott (1974) and Pissarides (1990, 2000) imply that an increased rate
of job-turnover will result in a higher natural rate of unemployment. The
analysis of Aghion and Howitt uncovers two competing e¤ects of growth on
unemployment. The rst is the capitalization e¤ect, whereby an increase
in growth raises the rate at which the returns from creating a rm will grow,
and hence increases the capitalized value of those returns. The second ef-
fect is the creative destruction, according to which an increase in growth
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may reduce the duration of a job match, which raises the equilibrium level
of unemployment both directly, by raising the job-separation rate, and indi-
rectly, by discouraging the creation of job vacancies and hence reducing the
job-nding rate. Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) solve the apparent incon-
sistency between these point of view. They use a matching model to show
that both types of e¤ects ("capitalization" and "creative destruction") can
be obtained, depending on the particular technological assumptions adopted.
Postel-Vinay (2002) claims that, while the short-run behavior of the con-
ventional matching model is quite well known, not much has been said so
far about the short-run behavior of unemployment in a creative destruction
context. He compares the short-run and long-run e¤ects of technological
progress on employment developing a simple model of frictional unemploy-
ment that capture the negative creative destruction e¤ects of technological
change on employment. In the long-run, faster technological change accel-
erates job obsolescence, but in the short-run it has positive and potentially
important e¤ects on employment.
This paper provides an extensive review of the theoretical and empirical
literature on "growth and employment" on the demand-side of the labour
market.1 This survey draws on some recent literature reviews as Aghion-
Howitt (1998) and Pugno (1998). It also presents the new more recent con-
tributions in the eld.
2 Dichotomy
The neoclassical growth theory does not consider the monetary aspects which
play a central role in the labour market analysis. Furthermore, it assumes
perfect competition in the labour market and inelasticity of the labour sup-
ply with respect to real wage. These assumptions exclude the existence of
1See Aricò (2003) for an analysis of some recent contributions about the problem of
growth and unemployment on the supply-side of the labour market.
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unemployment. Nevertheless, if elasticity of the labour supply with respect
to real wage was positive, we could not have steady state economic growth
with constant and positive unemployment.
Pugno (1998) introduces the labour market into the Solow growth model.
The start point is the following production function :
Y = ANK1  (1)
where 0 <  < 1 and Y , N , K are the output, the labour and the capital
used in the economy, respectively. The growth rate is constant and exoge-
nous:
_A = _A (2)
The accumulation function is:
_K = s
Y
K
(3)
where s is the propensity to save.
The equilibrium in the labour market is given by:
_N = n+  _w (4)
where 0 <  <1, n is the constant and exogenous growth of the population
and  is the labour supply elasticity.
The steady state growth is given by:
g = _Y = n+ _A
1 + 

= s
Y
K
(5)
If _A > 0, the wage in steady state grows because _w = _A

> 0 and the
unemployment goes down at the rate n  _N =   _A

.2 But this result is not
2To obtain this result we rst calculate the steady state growth _Y = _N + _A using
equations (1)and (2). Then we substitute in the equation _w = _Y   _N obtained by
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consistent for a steady state solution. This is the Solow problem. In his
most famous model, Solow assumed  = 0 and _A > 0, obtaining the solution
_Y = n+
_A

, where _A

= _ is the technological progress Harrod-neutral. Later,
he extended the labour supply function as in (4), but he imposed _A = 0,
obtaining _Y = n = _N and _w = 0. In this case, the unemployment is positive
and constant, but there is no role for technological progress.
Another dichotomist approach between growth and unemployment is
that of Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991). The authors provide micro-
foundations for their macroeconomic views. They do not consider the eco-
nomic growth in their analysis of the labor market and they only marginally
consider changes in capital and productivity. Wage bargaining and unem-
ployment are modelled within a stochastic framework, using a combination of
cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. The model generates powerful
results. Suppose that unemployment benets are always raised or lowered in
line with wages, so as to keep the replacement ratio constant. Then, accord-
ing to Layard, Nickell and Jackman, (1991), the equilibrium unemployment
rate (NAIRU) is completely una¤ected by variations in aggregate capital
stock, aggregate labour supply or technical progress. If there is investment
in new physical capital, trade unions will respond by forcing wages up to the
point where the loss of jobs on existing equipment is exactly equal to the extra
jobs created on the new equipment. If the labour supply is increased through
population growth or higher labour force participation, then bargainers will
adjust wages downwards to ensure that enough additional workers are ab-
sorbed into employment to keep the unemployment rate constant. The same
is true if there is technical progress.
This approach solves the Solow problembecause growth also takes place
when unemployment rate is constant and positive.3
di¤erentiation of the wage equation w =  YN .
3Gordon (1995) reproposes the dichotomy also showing that shocks in the labour supply,
which a¤ect unemployment, do not a¤ect the growth rate, at least in the long-run.
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3 New Theoretical Contributions
3.1 Complementarity between Capital and Employment
Despite the dichotomy between growth and unemployment has a strong tra-
dition, some theoretical developments show that it is based on unrealistic
assumptions.
Rowthorn (1999) argues that the literature on European unemployment
has focused on labour market issues, such as wage xing institutions, the role
of welfare benets, and the quality and motivation of the workforce.
Other potentially important issues, such as the impact of capital forma-
tion on employment, have been rather neglected. Indeed, many economists
believe that investment has little or no long-run e¤ect on employment. This is
the view taken in the highly inuential work of Layard, Nickell and Jackman
(1991).
Rowthorn argues that the model used by Layard, Nickell and Jackman
(1991) su¤ers from a potential weakness: it is assumed that labour and physi-
cal capital are close substitutes, so that variations in wages have a large e¤ect
on employment. This helps to explain why investment in new capital stock
leads to no net job creation in the Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) model.
Because the demand for labour is very elastic, the wage increase, generated
by investment in new capital stock, leads to a loss of employment on existing
equipment, which is enough to o¤set entirely the extra jobs created on new
equipment.
Production functions in the Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) model
are of the Cobb-Douglas variety in which , the elasticity of substitution
between labour and capital, is equal to unity.
Rowthorn argues that this is an unrealistic assumption. If it is replaced
by the more realistic assumption that  is well below unity, then none of
the major conclusion of the Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) model with
regard to unemployment is valid. In this case, capital investment does cre-
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ate employment even where benets are indexed to wages; while growth in
the labour supply, or technical progress with a labour augmenting bias will
cause a permanent rise in unemployment unless they are o¤set by additional
investment.
To derive this results, Rowthorn uses a version of the Layard, Nickell and
Jackman (1991) model which has been modied in three respects. Firstly,
the elasticity of substitution  is less than unity. Secondly, demand func-
tions facing individual rms are non-stochastic, unlike Layard, Nickell and
Jackman (1991) model. Finally, the Rowthorn model specically allows for
technical progress, which plays an important role in his approach. His model
shows that there is no dichotomy between economic growth and employment
and he nds a negative relationship between the two variables.
3.2 Exogenous Growth and Employment
Another way to drop the dichotomy between growth and unemployment (em-
ployment) is by introducing search costs in the labour market. These results
are obtained by models that are very di¤erent the one from the other.
3.2.1 The negative relationship
The Pissarides model (1990, 2000) is the rst attempt in the literature to
drop the dichotomy between economic growth and unemployment.
The central idea of the model is that trade in the labour market is an
economic activity. It is uncoordinated, time-consuming, and costly for both
rms and workers.
The number of jobs formed at any moment in time and the number of
rms looking for workers are given by a well behaved matching function:
XL = X(uL; vL) (6)
where L is the number of workers, u denote the unemployment rate and v
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is the number of vacant jobs as a fraction of the labour force. Only the uL
unemployed workers and the vL job vacancies engage in matching.
The matching function is assumed to be increasing in both arguments,
concave and homogeneous of degree 1. Homogeneity, or constant returns to
scale, is an important property: it is the only assumption that can ensure a
constant unemployment rate along the balanced-growth path.
For convenience Pissarides introduces the v=u ratio as a separate variable,
denoted by  and he writes the rate at which vacant jobs become lled as:
q() = x(
u
v
; 1) (7)
Unemployed workers move into employment according to a Poisson process
with rate x( (uL;vL)
uL
). Using  notation, this rate is equal to q().
 is an appropriate measure of the tightness of the labour market. The
dependence of the functions q() and q() on the relative number of traders
(tightness) is an example of a trading externality that will play a central role
in Pissarides analysis. The trading externality arise because, in the trading
sector of the economy, price is not the only allocative mechanism. There is a
stochastic rationing, which cannot be eliminated by price adjustments. But
it can be made better or worse for the representative traders by adjustments
in the relative number of traders in the market. If the ratio of hiring rms
to searching workers increases, the probability of rationing is higher for the
average rm and lower for the average worker and conversely.
The ow into unemployment results from job specic shocks that e¤ect
occupied at rate s. Without growth or turnover in the labour force, the mean
number of workers who enter unemployment during a small time interval
is s(1   u)Lt and the mean number who leave unemployment is XLt.
Rewriting the latter as uq()Lt, the mean rate of unemployment in the
steady state is:
s(1  u) = q()u (8)
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Pissarides assume that the market is large enough so that deviations from the
mean can be ignored and we can rewrite the equation above as an equation
determining unemployment:
u =
s
s+ q()
(9)
This is the rst key equation of the model. Given s, and  there is a unique
equilibrium unemployment rate. s is a parameter of the model.  is an
unknown.
Firms Firms are small and each has one job that is either vacant or oc-
cupied by a worker. When the job is occupied the rm rents capital k at a
rental r and produces output f(k). When it is vacant, the rm is actively
engaged in hiring at a xed cost 0 per unit time.
Let J be the present-discounted value of expected prot from an occupied
job and V the present-discounted value of expected prot from a vacant job.
With a perfect capital market, V satises:
rV =  0 + q()(J   V ) (10)
In equilibrium all prot opportunities from new job are exploited. Therefore,
the equilibrium condition for the supply of job is V = 0, implying:
J =
0
q()
(11)
For an individual rm 1
q()
is the expected duration of a vacancy, so equation
(11) states that in equilibrium the number of jobs is such that the expected
prot from a lled job is exactly equal to the expected cost of a vacant job.
In the labour market the job yields net return f(k)  k w, where f(k)
is real output, k is capital depreciation and w is the cost of labour.
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J is determined by the condition:
r(J + k) = f(k)  k   w   sJ (12)
where s is an adverse shock.
Maximizing J respect to k, we derive the equilibrium condition for the
rms capital stock:
f 0(k) = r +  (13)
The marginal product of capital is equal to the marginal cost of capital, the
rental plus the depreciation rate. Using equation (12) to substitute J out of
the equilibrium condition (11), we derive the key equation,
f(k)  (r + )k   w   (r + s)0
q()
= 0 (14)
This equation corresponds to a marginal condition for the demand for labour
under constant returns to scale. (r+s)0
q()
is the expected capitalized value of
the rms hiring cost.
Workers Workers have only an indirect inuence on unemployment in this
simple model, through their inuence on wages. A typical worker earn w
when employed and searches for a job when unemployed. During search
the workers enjoys some real return z. Let U and E denote the present-
discounted value of the expected income stream of, respectively, an unem-
ployed and an employed worker.
Wages Let wi be the wage rate negotiated between a rm and a worker
when they meet. The wage derived from the Nash Bargaining solution is the
wi
that maximizes the weighted product of the workers and the rms net
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return from the job:
(Ei   U)(Ji   V )(1 ) 0    1 (15)
In symmetric situations  is equal to 1=2. More generally, there may be
plausible bargaining situations that imply a di¤erent , in which  may be
interpreted as a relative measure of labours bargaining strength. Pissarides
treats  as a constant parameter strictly between 0 and 1.
The wage equation of the model is:
w = (1  )z + [f(k)  (r + )]k + 0 (16)
So the four equations determining equilibrium are:
u =
s
s+ q()
(17)
f(k)  (r + )k   w   (r + s)0
q()
= 0 (18)
w = (1  )z + [f(k)  (r + )k + 0 (19)
f 0(k) = (r + ) (20)
The equilibrium system is recursive. Given the interest rate, equation (20)
determines the capital stock; with k determined, the set (18)and (19) deter-
mines wages and labour-market tightness; and with  determined, equation
(17) determines unemployment. The system may be further simplied by
substituting wages from (19) into (18). Then 18 becomes:
(1  )[f(k)  (r + )k   z]  r + s+ q()
q()
0 = 0 (21)
The equilibrium can be illustrated by the gure (1)
Trade equilibrium is represented by equation (17), the condition that
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Figure 1: Vacancies, unemployment, and labour market tightness
equates ow into unemployment with ows out of it. In the u  v space, the
equation (17) corresponds to what is often called UV , or Beveridge curve.
The second curve drawn describes the equilibrium in production. Equilib-
rium in production is derived from the block (18) and (19). The intersection
of this line with the UV curve determines equilibrium vacancies and unem-
ployment.
To extend the static labour-market model to a model of balanced growth,
Pissarides (1990, 2000) introduces growth in the labour-force and labour-
augmenting technical progress. He changes the specication of two elements
of the model: the hiring cost and the value of time of the employed worker.
Let F (Ki; Ni) be a constant returns to scale production function, where
Ki is the capital of rm i and Ni is the employment of rm i.
Let L denote the labour force and suppose that it grows at the rate n.
The ow into unemployment consists of workers who have lost their jobs,
s(1   u)L, and of new entrants to the labour force, nL. The ow out of
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unemployment consists of workers who nd jobs, q()uL. In the steady
state inows must exceed outows by nuL, since unemployment must grow
at the rate n. Hence, in equilibrium:
s(1  u)L+ nL  q()uL = unL (22)
The equilibrium unemployment rate is:
u =
s+ n
s+ n+ q()
(23)
The e¤ect of growth in the labour force on the steady state condition for
unemployment is the same as the e¤ect of higher structural change in the
economy. Unemployment goes up, given the labour market tightness, because
more workers now join the unemployment pool. Nothing else changes in the
system. The wage bargain is still the same. So  is una¤ected by labour
force growth. The aggregate capital stock, employment, unemployment, and
the number of job vacancies all grow at the same rate n.
Growth in the labour force shifts the UV curve to the right, see gure
(2):
Since in equilibrium the u
v
ratio is una¤ected, growth shifts also the V S
curve up and to the left, such that the intersection of the new UV and
V S curves is on the original line through the origin. Thus, growth in the
labour force raises both unemployment and vacancies. Unemployment goes
up because the new labour force entrants rst enter the unemployment pool.
Suppose now that there is labour-augmenting technical progress at rate
g < r; the production function changes to:
F = F (Ki;e
gtNi) (24)
The interest rate is assumed to be exogenous and the supply of capital is
innite, an assumption that it is extreme in a model of long-run growth but
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Figure 2: The e¤ects of labour-force growth on equilibrium vacancies and
unemployment
helpful in the analysis of unemployment.
As in the standard neoclassical model, technological progress is disem-
bodied, in the sense that all existing and new jobs benet from the higher
labour productivity without the need to replace their capital stock.
Dening k as the ratio of the aggregate capital stock to the e¢ ciency
unitsof labour, and f(k) as the product for each e¢ ciency unit of labour,
f(k) and the marginal products of capital and labour satisfy:
f(k) =
1
egtN
F (K; egtN) = F (
K
egtN
; 1) (25)
Fk = f
0(k) (26)
Fn = e
gt[f(k)  kf 0(k)] (27)
By constant returns to scale each rm will have the same ratio k as in ag-
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gregate. So:
f 0(k)  r    = 0 (28)
Since k is dened in terms of e¢ ciency units of labour, the aggregate capital
stock grows at the rate of growth of the e¢ ciency units of labour, n+ g.
k is constant in the steady state, so given , wages grow at the rate of
technical progress g. The rate of technical progress inuences equilibrium
labour market tightness. Pissarides nds that at higher g,  is higher. With
higher , wages and vacancies are both higher and unemployment lower. This
happens because the rm incurs in some hiring costs, in order to acquire
workers who will yield some prot in the future. If the rm knows that in
the steady state hiring costs rise at the same rate as prots, it can economize
on future hiring costs by bringing forward some hiring. So at higher rates of
growth, it goes into the market with more vacancies.
The e¤ect of growth derived above is the capitalization e¤ect. At faster
rate of technological progress all future income ows are discounted at a lower
rate. Because the cost of creating a vacancy is borne now, whereas the prots
from it accrue in the future, the lower discount rate increases job creation.
3.2.2 The positive relationship
The theoretical work of Aghion and Howitt (1998) is as important as that one
of Pissarides but is goes in the opposite direction. The main consideration
that leads the authors to think that the question about the relationship
between growth and unemployment in the long run is interesting has to do
with the re-allocative aspect of growth. Faster economic growth must come
from a faster increase in knowledge. If the advancement of knowledge is
embodied in industrial innovations it is likely to raise the job destruction
rate, through automation, skill obsolescence, and the bankruptcy associated
with the process of creative destruction. So the increased growth is likely to
produce an increased rate of job-turnover, and the search theories of Lucas
and Prescott (1974) and Pissarides (1990, 2000) imply that an increased rate
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of job-turnover will result in a higher natural rate of unemployment.
The analysis of Aghion and Howitt uncovers two competing e¤ects of
growth on unemployment. The rst is the capitalization e¤ect, whereby
an increase in growth raises the rate at which the returns from creating a rm
will grow, and hence increases the capitalized value of those returns. The
capitalization e¤ectencourages more rms to enter. This raises the number
of job openings in the steady state equilibrium, as in Pissaridess analysis,
thereby reducing the equilibrium rate of unemployment by increasing the
job-nding rate.
The second e¤ect is the creative destruction, according to which an
increase in growth may reduce the duration of a job match, which raises
the equilibrium level of unemployment both directly, by raising the job-
separation rate, and indirectly, by discouraging the creation of job vacancies
and hence reducing the job-nding rate.4
The model The economy is composed of a continuum of agents, innitely-
lived. Each individual is endowed with a ow of one unit of labour services
and a stock of X units of human capital. The utility function is given by:
U(c) = E0
Z 1
0
cte
 rtdt (29)
where r > 0 is the subjective rate of time preference, and ct is the individ-
uals consumption of a nal good at time t. There is a continuum of rms,
innitely-lived. Each rm should be thought as a research facility for produc-
ing new knowledge. Let Dt be the sunk cost of setting-up a research facility
at date t. Each rm generates a stream of innovations according to a Poisson
process with a parameter :
4See Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) for a clear explanation about the di¤erent con-
clusions of Aghion-Howitt model and Pissarides model.
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The output ow of a production unit at time s is equal to:
ys = At	(xs   a) (30)
where a > 0 is the minimum human capital input representing overhead
costs; 	 is regular production function, At = A0egt is the units productivity
parameter. Aghion and Howitt in this model assume that growth of the
leading technology At depends upon an exogenous invention process, taking
the growth rate g as given.
The source of unemployment in the model is labour re-allocation across
rms. The aggregate ow of new matches is a function of the mass of search-
ing workers and the mass of vacancies. In this model the whole labour force
is involved in the matching process. So the rate of matching will be m(1; v),
where v is the number of vacancies in the economy. A rm spends the amount
of time 1=q searching before its machine is matched with an appropriate
worker and a worker must wait 1=p units of time before being successfully
matched with a machine. Whenever 1
p(v)
> S (S is the life time of a produc-
tion unit), there will be a positive amount of (involuntary) unemployment in
the economy.
The ow of workers into unemployment is (1   u) 1
S
, where u is the un-
employment rate; the ow out of unemployment is the job-nding rate p(v).
So the unemployment equation is:
u = 1  Sp(v) (31)
The direct creative destructione¤ect of growth on unemployment derives
from the fact that any production unit has to incur a xed overhead cost in
human capital whose price in terms of nal consumption rises at the economy-
wide rate of growth. Thus a production unit with xed technology becomes
unable to produce enough to cover its xed cost. The faster the price of
human capital grows, the sooner the production units will hit the zero-prot
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bound. So, there is an inverse relationship between the growth rate g and
the duration of a match S.
Aghion and Howitt have found other two opposing e¤ects of growth rate
on the rms incentive to enter and therefore on the equilibrium rate of
vacancy creation v. First, it will reduce the net discount rate at which
rms capitalize their expected income, which increases the present benet of
entry. This is the capitalization e¤ect, which increases the equilibrium level
of vacancies v and hence decreases unemployment. Second, an increase in
growth reduces the life time of production units and induces a faster decline
of prots. So, an increase in growth reduces the value of each innovation and
tends to reduce the rms incentive to enter and create vacancies. This is the
indirect creative destructione¤ect.
So, Aghion and Howitt have found three e¤ects of growth on unemploy-
ment: the direct creative destructione¤ect, which increases u; the indirect
creative destructione¤ect, which also increases u and the capitalization
e¤ect, which reduces u.
Whether the overall e¤ect will be to raise or reduce u will depend upon
the relative strength of these e¤ects. The numerical example made by the
authors suggest that the unique (steady state) equilibrium unemployment
rate u(g) can be represented as an inverted U -shaped function of g, whenever
the entry cost is positive but su¢ ciently small. For high growth rates the
capitalizatione¤ect dominates.
Following Aghion and Howitt (1998), Pissarides (2000) analysis the cre-
ative destructione¤ect of growth on unemployment. He supposes that tech-
nology is embodied in new capital investment. Instead of the disembodied
technology of the preceding model (1990), which beneted all existing jobs,
new technology now can benet only jobs that explicitly invest in new equip-
ment. In this case, higher rate of growth implies lower . This result contrasts
with those derived for the case of disembodied technological progress, where
for a given r market tightness is higher at the higher rate of technological
18
Figure 3: Growth and Unemployment relationship
progress. The reason is that whereas in the case of disembodied progress both
revenues and costs rise faster when there is more technological progress, in
the case of embodied progress only costs rise in existing jobs.
Thus the capitalizatione¤ect in the latter case works against jobs cre-
ation, since revenues are received at a at rate but costs are paid at on
increasing rate.
Anyway, the apparent inconsistency between Pissarides and Aghion and
Howitt points of view is simply resolved by Mortensen and Pissarides (1998).
They show that both types of results ("capitalization" e¤ect and "creative de-
struction" e¤ect) can be obtained, depending on the particular technological
assumptions adopted. The "capitalization" e¤ect rests on the assumption
that technology is disembodied, as in the Solow model. This implies that
rms are able to update continuously their technology, without costs and
no obsolescence. The "creative destruction", instead, rests on the assump-
tions that technology is embodied. This implies that only new jobs can take
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advantage from technological improvement and existing jobs cannot benet
from it.
Pissarides and Vallanti (2004) propose a new equilibrium model which
shows that the net impact of Total Factor Productivity growth on employ-
ment is negative when new technology is embodied in new jobs but positive
when it is disembodied. This model draws heavily on models with frictions
and quasi-rents by Pissarides (2000), Aghion and Howitt (1998), Mortensen
and Pissarides (1998) and others.
To derive the growth e¤ects Pissarides and Vallanti assume that job cre-
ation requires some investment on the part of the rm, which may be a set-up
cost or a hiring cost. Growth inuences job creation through capitalization
e¤ects and job destruction through obsolescence. The precise inuence on
each depends on whether new technology can be introduced into ongoing job
relationships, or whether it needs to be embodied in new job creation. Both
types of results can be obtained, depending on the particular technological
assumptions adopted. Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1998), Pissarides
and Vallanti assume that there are two types of technology. One, denoted
by A1,can be applied in existing jobs as well as new ones: this is the disem-
bodied technological progress, as in Solow model, and existing jobs can take
full advantage of new technological improvements. The other, denoted by
A2, can only be applied in new jobs: this is the Schumpeterianassumption
of embodied technology. Let the rate of growth of A1be a and the rate of
growth of A2 be (1   )a, with 0    1, so the total rate of growth of
technology is a. The parameter  measures the extent to which technology
is disembodied. If  = 0, this implies the extreme Schumpeterianassump-
tion of embodied technology and if  = 1 we have the Solow disembodied
case. The parameter a is the rate of growth of TFP in the steady state and
is observable while the parameter  is unobservable by the econometrician,
but Pissarides and Vallanti calculate an approximate value for it from the
empirical estimates of their model.
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3.2.3 Growth, wealth and the natural rate
Hoon and Phelps (1997) study the e¤ect of faster technical progress using
a general-equilibrium incentive-wage model of the natural rate of unemploy-
ment. In its closed economy version, the model implies that, in the limit,
as the steady-growth rate is approached, the increase in the rate of progress
is neutral for the natural unemployment rate. Its e¤ects are completely o¤-
set by the equal increase in the rate of interest (r)it induces. In the open
economy, however, the increase of the productivity growth rate () reduces
the net-of growth interest rate, r  . An increase in this interest rate has a
substitution e¤ect: it encourages employees not to quit now, but later when
wages will be lower. A reduction of this net interest rate from faster wage
growth put the substitution e¤ect into reverse: quit now, not later when
wages will be higher and also the opportunity cost of quitting. However, it
may be that there is little substitutability between present and future con-
sumption, and likewise, little substitutability between present enjoyments on
the job and future ones. So, the substitution e¤ect may be small.
3.3 Endogenous Growth and Unemployment
In the models so far considered the economic growth was originated by an
exogenous increase of the productivity or an exogenous capital accumulation.
In this section we will introduce models in which the economic growth is
endogenous.
3.3.1 Endogenous innovations
Aghion and Howitt (1998) extended their basic model, coming closer to en-
dogenous growth models by assuming that innovations are the unique source
of growth. More specically, if  denotes the arrival rate of innovations in
each rm,  is the size of technological improvements, and f is the total
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number of innovating rms in the economy, we have:
g = f ln  (32)
In steady state equilibrium, the ow of new plants must be equal to the ow
of all plants that become obsolete. The former is f ; the latter is the same
as the ow of workers into unemployment, (1  u) g
 
.5
So we have:
f = (1  u) g
 
(33)
From (32) and (33) we get:
g = (1  u) g
 
ln  (34)
The e¤ect of the two sources of growth, namely the frequency and the size
of innovations, on unemployment is unambiguous. Consider rst the e¤ect
of an increase in the frequency parameter . Using (32) and (33) we have:
1 = (1  u) ln 
 
(35)
hence du
d
= 0; an increase in the frequency of innovations has no e¤ect
on unemployment since it increases both the ow of new plants and the
ow of old plants which become obsolete in the same proportions. On the
other hand, an increase in the size of innovation speeds up the obsolescence
process without a¤ecting the job creation rate directly and unemployment
will increase.
3.3.2 Endogenous growth and search costs
In the models so far considered causality runs from growth to unemploy-
ment. But the existence of causality links working in the opposite direction,
5 g
  is the rate of plant obsolescence and (1 u) is the number of plants using any given
technological vintage.
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i.e. from unemployment to growth, seems very likely. Bean and Pissarides
underline one of the possible channels through which unemployment may af-
fect long run growth, combining an endogenous growth model of the Arrow-
Romer type with a matching model of the labour market.6
The technology is given by:
Yt = F ( Kt; NtKt) = Ktf(nt) (36)
where Yt is the output in period t, Nt is employment, Kt is the capital stock
at the beginning of period t and nt = KtNt=Kt.7
The labour market is characterized by matching frictions. Potential work-
ers and employers have to search for each other. All matches last one period
and the matching technology for aggregate employment is given by:
Nt = m( Jt;Lt) (37)
where Jt is the aggregate number of jobs opened at the start of period t and
Lt is the number of young households.
Householders become capitalists in the second period of their lives. Prots
are:
t = Ktf(nt)  wtNt   qtJt (38)
where wt is the wage and qt is the cost of opening up a job slot. Bean and
Pissarides assume that qt =  Kt.8
Because of the matching frictions, there are rents to be shared from a suc-
cessful match between the rm and a potential worker. Bean and Pissarides
assume that the wage is determined as the outcome of a Nash bargain be-
tween the rm and the individual worker. The authors describe household
preferences by a linearly homogeneous utility function, U(Ct1; C
t
2), where C
t
1
6Modied to allow for an overlapping generation structure.
7A bar over a variable indicates an economy-wide quantity.
8Hiring costs rise with the state of technical progress
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is the consumption in youth and Ct2 is the consumption in old age. In that
case maximum utility is given by:
max
Ct1;C
t
2
Ut = V

1
Rt+1

yt (39)
where Rt+1is the return on savings between period t and period t+1, and yt
is income.
The wage satises:
wt = argmax[V (
1
Rt+1
)(wt   tt)  V ( 1
Rt+1
)zt]
[ Ktf
0(nt)  wt]1  (40)
where tt is a per capita tax paid by workers and zt is an unemployed workers
income. Bean and Pissarides assume that taxes and unemployment income
rise with the state of technology so that tt =  Kt and zt =  Kt. The
parameter  provides an index of relative bargaining strength. The wage is
just a weighted average of the marginal revenue product and the opportunity
cost of working:
wt = [f
0(nt) + (1  )( + )] Kt (41)
The labour market equilibrium is described by:
f 0(Nt)  g(Nt) =  +  (42)
where g(Nt) = [
m 1(Nt)
Nt
+ Ntf
00(Nt)](1  ).
The rst component in g(Nt) reects the additional cost of bringing cap-
ital and labour together, which tends to reduce employment relative to the
frictionless economy. The second component captures the strategic use of
employment by the rm to a¤ect the outcome of the wage bargain; because
higher employment lowers the marginal product and thus also the wage, this
tends to raise employment above that in a frictionless economy. The authors
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Figure 4: Determination of Equilibrium
make the assumption that f 00(Nt) < g0(Nt), so the overall e¤ect is to reduce
Nt.
The evolution of the capital stock is described by the following equation:
Kt+1
Kt
= s(Rt+1)[(wt   tt)Nt + zt(1 Nt)]=Kt (43)
The determination of the equilibrium can be shown in the diagram in gure
(4).
NN is the labour market equilibrium schedule, while KK is the capital
market equilibrium schedule. Along a balanced growth path with a constant
employment rate, the rate of growth of output is just Kt+1
Kt
  1.
Bean and Pissarides make some interesting comparative static exercises.
First, they consider a reduction in hiring cost. This shifts the NN sched-
ule out, raising both employment and the rate of capital accumulation and
growth. Second an increase in taxes,  has the opposite e¤ect, shifting the
NN schedule in and KK schedule down. Finally, an increase in the propen-
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sity to consume shifts the KK schedule down, lowering the rate of growth
but leaving employment untouched.
A more interesting result is the e¤ect of increasing the relative bargaining
strength of workers, . The e¤ect on growth is ambiguous. On the one hand
the increase in bargaining strength shifts income entrepreneurs to workers.
Since in this model it is the workers who do the saving, Bean and Pissarides
get a sort of anti-Kaldorian result. This is not the only e¤ect because, pro-
vided the strategic e¤ectis not too strong, unemployment will rise which,
by reducing the available pool of savings, tends to reduce the growth rate.
The overall e¤ect on the growth rate depends on which e¤ect dominates.
Bean and Pissarides extend their model in one in which consumption and
investment goods are now distinct. They analyze the mechanism through
which an increase in the propensity to consume raise both output and in-
vestment. This mechanism relies not on the traditional Keynesian accelera-
tor, but rather on a new Keynesianstory of imperfect competition in the
consumption good sector.
3.3.3 Trade-o¤ between growth and employment
Eriksson (1997) investigates how unemployment and the long run growth
inuence each other in the steady state. The work is built on Pissarides but
Ramsey preferences are introduced, inuencing the interest rate.
One main nding (subject to the qualication that consumersintertem-
poral elasticity of substitution is small) is that there is a trade-o¤ between
successful growth and high unemployment, if one considers exogenous change
in the growth rate, or in the productivity parameter in the production func-
tion when there is endogenous growth. On the other hand, when growth
is a¤ected in indirect ways (i.e. when growth is endogenously changing in
response to variations in parameters such as the capital tax rate or the unem-
ployment benet) variations in exogenous parameters that decrease unem-
ployment also make growth more successful. Since such variations can arise
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anywhere in the economy, the author nds not only that growth conditions
a¤ect unemployment, but also that labour market conditions a¤ect growth.
3.3.4 Endogenous capital accumulation
Postel-Vinay (1998) takes the standard search model of Pissarides (1990) and
allows for endogenous capital accumulation and for unbounded endogenous
growth by means of a production externality implying non-decreasing returns
to capital. The model shows the existence and uniqueness of a balanced
growth path. The economy is basically the same as that of Pissarides (1990).
Time is continuous, and all variables are indexed by time. All agents have
perfect foresight. One good is produced by a large (xed) number of identical
rms, using labour and capital as inputs. The production technology is the
following:
Yt = f(Kt; Ktlt) (44)
where Yt is the representative rms output, Kt is the stock of capital in that
rm, and lt is the quantity of labour it employs. Kt denotes the aggregate
stock of capital, which appears here as a Romer style externality to make
unbounded endogenous growth possible.
Jobs are determined at same exogenous rate of structural change, so
that employment in the representative rm evolves according to:
_lt = q(t)vt   lt (45)
 is the usual tightness parameter, q(t) is the hiring rate.
t = vt=ut (46)
where ut is the number of unemployed workers, vt is the number of vacant
jobs at same date t.
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The dynamic equation for the tightness parameter is:
q;t
_t
t
= f 01(1; lt) + 
q(t)
t
[Ktf
0
2(1; lt)  wt] 
_t
t
(47)
where q;t > 0 denotes the elasticity of the hiring rate q, t is the real cost
of a vacancy per unit time.
Finally, the author assumes that labour is supplied inelastically, and that
the amount of labour available is normalized to one. This normalization
implies that ut = 1  lt. This allows to rewrite the equation (40) in terms of
(t; lt):
_lt = tq(t)(1  lt)  lt (48)
Households They supply labour without disutility. They work, consume
and lend capital to the rms. They are endowed with a C.E.S. function, with
intertemporal elasticity of substitution , and a discount factor . If ct is the
consumption, it evolves according to the Keynes-Ramsey rule:
_ct
ct
= (rt   ) (49)
Comparative statics The comparative statics made by the author sug-
gests that the sign of the relationship between the long run rate of growth
and the steady state level of employment is not totally clear-cut. In particu-
lar, the only e¤ect of a stronger bargaining power of the worker, like that of
more generous unemployment compensation or heavier hiring costs, in this
simple model is to raise the cost of labour, thus lowering employment. Unlike
Bean and Pissarides 1993), in this model there is not an anti-Kaldorian
e¤ect of a rise in the earnings of workers, since Postel-Vinay does not assume
di¤erent saving behaviors of workers and capitalists.
From an empirical perspective, if one believes that the observed dispersion
in labour market performances stems from di¤erent degrees of rigidity in
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labour market institutions, then the model predicts a negative cross-sectional
relationship between growth and unemployment.
3.3.5 Growth, Unemployment and Labor Market Policy
Mortensen (2004) studies an economy characterized by the Schumpeterian
model of endogenous growth as developed and studied in Grossman and
Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1998). The single consumption
good is produced with a variety of intermediate goods and services. A new
more productive or higher quality version of each intermediate input arrives
from time to time at a rate endogenously determined by collective R&D in-
vestment. Labor is the only factor used to produce intermediate goods and
services and it can also be used to provide research e¤ort. The rate at which
unemployed workers are matched with rms is determined by a function of
unemployed workers and vacancies, denoted M(u; v). By assumption the
matching function is increasing, concave and homogenous of degree one in
its arguments, vacancies v and unemployment u. The wage is determined
as the outcome of bilateral bargaining problem. The free entry condition,
the equality of the expected cost of innovation with the expected present
value of the future rents attributable to an innovation, requires that a neg-
ative relationship holds between market tightness and the rate of creative
destruction. New rms with job vacancies ow into the stock of potential
entrants at the rate of creative destruction and out of the stock at the rate at
which rms with vacancies are matched with production workers. The steady
state condition, which requires the equality of these two ows, and the labor
force identity, which implies that the available labor force must be divided
into between those who are employed in production, employed in research,
and unemployed, requires that a positive relationship holds between market
tightness and the rate of creative destruction. An equilibrium solution to
the model is a creative-destruction rate and a labor market tightness ratio
that satisfy both these conditions. Unemployment is determined by the labor
29
market steady state conditions, while the growth rate is the product of the
rate of creative destruction and the log of quality step size.
In the model, unemployment and the aggregate growth rate are simulta-
neously determined. As a consequence there is no clear prediction about how
the two should be correlated across countries and time. Therefore, the model
suggests a list of joint determinants of the two variables. So, an increase in
the bargaining power of workers increases the workers share of the prot
earned by a producing rm. The rate of creative destruction and market
tightness both fall with bargaining power and the unemployment rate rises.
Labor force shocks identify the positive relationship between unemployment
and growth implied by the free entry condition while interest shocks identify
the negative relationship implied by the labor market steady state condi-
tion and the employment identity. Finally, R&D productivity increases the
equilibrium growth rate but the net e¤ects on labor market tightness and
unemployment are unclear.
The model shows the e¤ect of labor market policy on unemployment and
growth. An increase in the unemployment compensation or the payroll tax
increases the cost of labor and the market tightness is adversely a¤ected. The
demand for labor decreases with tax and unemployment benet. Therefore
more workers are available for employment in R&D. Unemployment increases
but the net e¤ect on the rate of creative destruction is ambiguous.
Finally, the model shows that employment protection policy reduces the
return to job creation through innovation and entry, the growth rate is ad-
versely a¤ected by employment protection.
3.4 Unemployment and Technology
Postel-Vinay (2002) shows the short-run behavior of unemployment in a
creative destruction context. He supposes the correct model is that of
Schumpeterianinspiration and the economy leaves no space for any form
of capitalization e¤ect, so that a speedup in growth eventually leads to a fall
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in long-run employment. Postel-Vinay shows that the short-run behavior of
unemployment in response to a sudden change in the rate of technological
progress is in some sense perverse, since it goes in the opposite direction
to its own long-run tendency. In the long-run, faster technological progress
accelerates job obsolescence, which reduces equilibrium level of employment.
But in the short-run it has a positive and potentially important e¤ects on
employment. The intuition behind this result is the following. Creative de-
struction entails a drop in the present value of new jobs. Firms o¤er less
jobs because they anticipate the drop in protability and, as a consequence,
the available number of new jobs decreases. This makes existing jobs more
valuable. Indeed, by cutting the opportunity costs of older matches, faster
technological change postpones their destruction and because of the decreas-
ing of the job destruction rate, the level of employment rises. The dynamic
behavior of unemployment exhibits one essential feature: whatever is the
sign of the technological shock, it causes unemployment to start a motion in
a direction that contradicts its nal long-run variation. Therefore, the pre-
diction of Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1998)
that a speedup in technological progress would worsen long-run unemploy-
ment should come with the restriction that the short-run predictions of this
kind of models are exactly the opposite. Postel-Vinay (2002) argues that this
restriction is important since it may help the "Schumpeterian" model to t
the data.
The subsequent dynamics are characterized by a phenomenon known in
the vintage capital literature as echo e¤ects. Technologies become obsolete
after a certain period of time, say T . A job created at some date t will be de-
stroyed when reaching age T . As a results, everything happening at t on the
side of job creations echoes at t+T on the side of job destructions. This im-
plies that the initial adjustment of unemployment is periodically reverberated
in the dynamics, leading to a non-monotonic convergence of unemployment
towards its steady state value. Furthermore, the dynamic behavior of un-
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employment in the model is asymmetric. In fact, a slowdown in technical
change produces a faster, and more important in magnitude, short-run rise
in unemployment than the short-run drop coming after a speedup in techni-
cal change. These features are usually respectively referred to as steepness
asymmetry and deepness asymmetry in the empirical literature.
Summarizing, Postel-Vinay (2002) shows that faster (slower) technolog-
ical change has a positive (negative), and potentially important short-run
inuence on the level of employment by causing a short-run drop (surge) in
job destruction.
Those results seem to reconcile the "Schumpeterian" view with the ob-
served data. For instance, those results tend to partially reconcile the "Schum-
peterian" view of the e¤ects of technological change on labor markets with
the response of unemployment rates in most OECD countries to the 1970s
productivity slowdown.
4 Empirical contributions
This section illustrates some empirical contributions that try to shed light
on the relationship between growth and employment. It is worth emphasis-
ing the fact that empirical studies in this eld are still few with respect to
the theoretical contributions. Furthermore, there is no consensus regarding
the sign of the correlation between growth and employment either across
countries or across long periods of time in the same country.
Bean and Pissarides (1993) study the simple correlation between unem-
ployment rate and measures of productivity growth across OECD countries
over the periods 1955-1965, 1965-1975 and 1975-1985. In particular, they
study the simple correlation between unemployment rate and labor produc-
tivity growth, and between unemployemt rate and Total Factor Productivity
growth. Their results show that there is mild evidence of a negative rela-
tionship between the two variables over the full sample but this is primarily
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a consequence of the fact that the 1975-1985 period was one of both lower
productivity growth and higher unemployment than the two earlier periods.
Caballero (1993) organizes a few very preliminary empirical application
of Bean and Pissarides model. The data are quarterly from 1966 to 1989 for
U.S.A. and UK. Since the main concern of Bean and Pissarides paper is with
medium/long-run issues, Caballero lters out the high frequency components
of the data.9 In the rst experiment Caballero studies the comovement of
unemployment and per capita growth, through a reduction in hiring costs. He
nds a positive correlation at the medium/low frequency for both countries,
while it is positive for UK but zero or even negative for USA at very low
frequencies. This evidence suggests that the correlation between growth and
unemployment is all but clear. However, if one must pick a sign, positive
seems more appropriate than negative.
In the second experiment, an increase in the bargaining power of workers,
he nds that the correlation between growth and labour share -controlling
for unemployment- is essentially zero for USA and very negative for UK.10
The third experiment consists in analyzing what happens if the marginal
propensity to consume increases. Caballero uses corporate prots data (l-
tered) for the USA, to proxy for medium/low frequency variations in the
degree of competitiveness. Then he tests if the product of these measures
and the consumption/income ratio (as a proxy for the marginal propensity
to consume) are positively correlated with growth, controlling for unemploy-
ment. Caballero nds that the conditional correlation is positive and very
signicant.
Hoon and Phelps (1997) report a strong positive correlation between the
change in unemployment and the extent of the slow down in productivity
9Caballero presents two sets of results: the rst one leaves only the very low frequency
component of the data, while the second one only removes the very high frequency com-
ponent.
10The results must be taken with some caution since conventional t-statisics are inap-
propriate when data ar ltered.
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growth over the same time period analyzed by Bean and Pissarides (1993)
across the G7 countries. Among those countries, it appears that Japan is an
outlier maybe because of ring inhibitions or an increased undercount of the
unemployment.
Postel-Vinay (2002) reports results of numerical simulations of his the-
oretical model that I discussed in the previous section. The numerical val-
ues of the exogenous parameters are more or less arbitrarily chosen to have
plausible steady state values of the endogenous variables. The matching
technology adopted is a Cobb-Douglas: m(u; v) = u0:4v0:6. Postel-Vinay
(2002) considers two values for the rate of technological progress: 3 and 4
percent. The simulated dynamics follow a jump at date t0 = 0 either from
g = 3 percent to g0 = 4 percent, or from g = 4 percent to g0 = 3 percent.
Postel-Vinay (2002) shows the presence of a large, quasi-periodic, non-
monotonic uctuations, phenomenon known as echo e¤ect in the vintage
capital literature. The intuition behind this result is simple: anything hap-
pening at any given date t  t0 on the job creation sideof the model is
reected T 
0
periods later on the job destruction side.
The short-run adjustment of unemployment goes in the "wrong way"
with regard to its long-run variation. This initial adjustment is of potentially
great magnitude. In the numerical example shown by Postel-Vinay (2002), a
1 percent rise in the growth rate causes unemployment to rise by 1:6 percent
in the long-term, and to drop by a bit over 3 percent in the short run. On
the contrary, a 1 percent drop in g induces a 1:6 percent drop in long-term
unemployment that has to be compared to a four and a half times more
important short-run rise of about 7:2 percent.
Those results seem to reconcile the Schumpeterian view with the observed
data. For instance, the general productivity slowdown of the 1970s came with
a sharp rise in the unemployment rates of all OECD countries, a picture of
which the Schumpeterian model now seems to be able to give a replica.
Another interesting work is that of Mauro and Carmeci (2000). They
34
propose a model of endogenous growth with ine¢ ciencies in the production
of human capital due to unemployment. The rationale of this model can be
found in the observation that youngsters need to acquire rm-specic knowl-
edge by working for schooling human capital to become productive. The
model implies a negative long-run relationship between growth and equilib-
rium unemployment. It is estimated using an unbalanced panel data of 15
OECD countries covering the period 1965-1995. The estimation method is
GMM. The data support the theory. They nd that youth unemployment
inuences negatively and signicantly the growth of output and more impor-
tantly its inclusion renders the e¤ect of the schooling investment signicant
and positive.
Fagerberg, Verspagen and Caniëls (1997) explore the relationship between
technology, growth and employment growth across European regions. The
sample consists of 64 regions from four di¤erent countries: (West) Germany,
France, Italy and Spain. They nd a negative correlation between growth
and unemployment and they explain this result through the negative impact
of unemployment on inward migration. In fact, net inward migration was
found to have a strong, positive impact on growth. Unemployment acts as a
factor that limits net inward migration and, hence, growth.
A more recent empirical contribution is that one of Pissarides and Val-
lanti (2004). They develop a new equilibrium model for employment and
estimate it with an annual panel data for the United States, Japan and Eu-
rope. The structural model is estimated by a three stage least squares. The
period examined goes from 1965 to 1997. Results are inconsistent with the
Schumpeterian assumption of embodied technology and creative destruction.
On the contrary they nd support for the Solow assumption of disembodied
technology. They show that the e¤ects of faster Total Factor Productivity on
employment are positive and signicant, after an initial period of not more
than one year. Furthermore, they use their empirical estimates to obtain a
prediction of the extent to which exogenous Total Factor Productivity growth
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can account for the observed change in the rate of employment. The esti-
mates do a good job in attributing the rise and fall in trend unemployment
in the USA to the 1970s productivity slowdown, but productivity changes
are generally less successful in explaining the dynamics of European unem-
ployment.
5 Final Remarks
In this paper I have presented and discussed the theoretical and empirical
contributions that try to shed light on the relationship between growth and
employment. First, the theoretical contributions have been discussed. After
a brief description of the dichotomic approach between growth and employ-
ment and having analyzed its issues in section 2, I have discussed the recent
contributions that drop the dichotomy between the two variables in section 3.
These contributions are very diversied in hypothesis, methods and conclu-
sions. I have analyzed in detail the contribution of Pissarides (1990), which is
the rst attempt in the literature to drop the dichotomy between growth and
employment. Then, I have presented the contribution of Aghion and Howitt
(1998), which goes in the opposite direction with respect to that one of Pis-
sarides (1990). We have seen that this apparent inconsistency between these
two points of view is simply resolved by Mortensen and Pissarides (1998).
After discussing the contributions in which economic growth is treated as
exogenous, I have introduced models in which the economic growth is endoge-
nous. I have also presented a recent model proposed by Postel-Vinay (2002)
in which the short-run behavior of unemployment in a creative destruction
context is considered. Finally, I have discussed some empirical contributions
and I think it is worth emphasising the fact that the empirical contributions
are still few with respect to the scope and the importance of the theoretical
debate.
However, more work need to be done, both theoretical and empirical, and
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an interesting avenue for future research might be the attempt to link the
demand-side of the labor market to the supply-side factors.
References
[1] Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (1991), Unemployment. A Symptom of Stag-
nation or a side-e¤ect of Growth?,European Economic Review vol. 35,
535-41.
[2] Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (1992), A Model of Growth through Creative
Destruction,Econometrica vol. 60, 323-51.
[3] Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (1994), Growth and Unemployment,Review
of Economic Studies vol. 61, 477-94.
[4] Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (1998), "Endogenous Growth Theory", MIT
Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts.
[5] Aghion, P. and G. Saint-Paul (1991), "On the Virtue of Bad Times",
Discussion Paper n. 578, Centre for Economic Policy Research, mimeo.
[6] Aricò, F. (2003), "Growth and Unemployment: Towards a Theoretical
Integration", Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 17, 419-459.
[7] Ball. L. and R. Mo¢ tt (2002), Productivity Growth and the Phillips
Curve. In the Roaring Nineties: Can Full Employment be Sustained?,
edited by A.B. Krueger and R. Solow, New York: Russel Sage Fundation.
[8] Barro, R.,and X. Sala-i-Martin (1995), "Economic Growth", New York,
McGraw-Hill.
[9] Bean, C. and C. Pissarides (1993), Unemployment, Consumption and
Growth,European Economic Review vol. 37, 837-54.
37
[10] Birchenall, J.A. (2002), "Growth and Unemployment (without market
frictions)", University of Chicago, mimeo.
[11] Boeri, T. (1996), "Is Job Turnover Countercyclical?", Journal of Labor
Economics, vol. 14, 603-25.
[12] Caballero, R. (1993), Comments on Bean and Pissarides,European
Economic Review vol. 37, 855-59.
[13] Cristini, A. (1999), " Unemployment and Primary Commodities Prices",
Mcmillan Press LTD.
[14] Davis, S. and J. Haltiwanger (1993), Gross Job Creation, Destruction
and Employment Reallocation,Quarterly Journal of Economics vol.
107, pp. 819-64.
[15] Davis, S., J. Haltiwanger and S. Shuh (1996), "Job Creation and De-
struction", MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[16] Eriksson, C. (1997), Is There a Trade-o¤ between Employment and
Growth?,Oxford Economic Papers vol. 49, 77-88.
[17] Fagerberg, J., B. Verspagen and M. Caniëls (1997), Technology,
Growth and Unemployment across European Regions,Journal of the
Regional Studies Association vol. 31, 457-66.
[18] Friedman, M. (1968), The Role of Monetary Policy,American Eco-
nomic Review vol. 58, 1-17.
[19] Gordon, R.J. (1995), Is There a Trade-o¤ between Unemployment and
Productivity Growth,NBER Working Paper n. 5081.
[20] Hoon, H.T. and E. Phelps (1997), Growth, Wealth and the Natural
Rate: Is Europes Job Crisis a Growth Crisis?, European Economic
Review vol. 41, 549-57.
38
[21] Layard, R., S. Nickell and R. Jackman (1991), Unemployment. Macro-
economic Performance and the Labour Market, Oxford University Press.
[22] Lucas, R.E. (1988), "On The Mechanics of Economic Development",
Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 22, 3-42.
[23] Mauro, L. and G. Carmeci (2000), Long Run Growth and Investment in
Education: Does Youth Unemployment Matter?,University of Trieste
Di.S.E.S.Working Papers n. 69.
[24] Mortensen, D. T. and C. Pissarides (1998), Technological Progress, Job
Creation and Job Destruction,Review of Economic Dynamics vol. 1,
733-753.
[25] Mortensen, D. T. (2004), "Growth, Unemployment, and Labor Market
Policy", Northwestern University, mimeo.
[26] Nickell, S., L. Nunziata, W. Ochel and G. Quintini (2001), "The Bev-
eridge Curve, Unemployment and Wages in the OECD from 1960s to
the 1990s", Discussion Paper n. 502, Centre for Economic Performance,
LSE, mimeo.
[27] Paci, R., F. Pigliaru and M. Pugno (2001), "Disparities in Economic
Growth and Unemployment Across The European Regions: A Sectoral
Perspective", Working Paper, Contributi di ricerca Crenos, Università
di Cagliari
[28] Phelps, E.S. (1994), Structural Slumps, the Modern Equilibrium The-
ory of Unemployment, Interests and Assets, Cambridge MA, Harvard
University Press.
[29] Pissarides, C. (1990), Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, Oxford,
Blackwell.
39
[30] Pissarides, C. (2000), Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, second edi-
tion, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[31] Pissarides, C., and G. Vallanti (2004), "Productivity Growth and Em-
ployment: Theory and Panel Estimates, Centre for Economic Perfor-
mance, Discussion Paper series, forthcoming.
[32] Postel-Vinay, F. (1998), Transitional Dynamics of the Search Model
with Endogenous Growth,Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
vol. 22, 1091-115.
[33] Postel-Vinay, F. (2002), "The Dynamic of Technological Unemploy-
ment", International Economic Review vol.43, 737-60.
[34] Pugno, M. (1998), Economic Growth and Unemployment: Recent The-
oretical Developments, Economia Politica, n.1
[35] Romer, P. (1986), "Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth", Journal
of Political Economy, vol. 94, 1002-36.
[36] Romer, P. (1990), "Endogenous Technological Change", Journal of Po-
litical Economy, vol. 98, 71-102.
[37] Rowthorn, R. (1999), Unemployment, Wage Bargaining and Capital-
Labour Substitution,Cambridge Journal of Economics vol. 23, 413-25.
[38] Solow, R.M. (1956),A Contribution to the Theory of Economic
Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics vol. 70, 65-95.
[39] Solow, R. (1957), "Technical Change and Aggregate Production Func-
tion", Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 39, 312-20.
40
